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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Title of Dissertation: Application of HFACS (The Human Factors Analysis 
and Classification System) to the Korean domestic 
passenger ship accidents  
 
 
Degree:                              MSc 
 
This dissertation aims to review the passenger ship safety in Korea by identifying 
human error causal factor in the investigation reports. 
Although more than 80% of the causes of marine casualties reported as human error, 
research and application of human factors are still insufficient compared to the 
development of marine technology. The sinking accident of Sewol ferry that left 304 
casualties is also an accident that is caused by a combination of various human errors 
such as cargo overload, cargo securing faulty, and inappropriate maneuvering. In 
order to prevent the further passenger ship accident, there is an urgent need to 
address the safety problems caused by human error.  
The paper reviewed the 30 accidents investigation reports of Korean domestic 
passenger ship from 2014 to 2015. A total of 96 contributing factors were obtained 
from the accident reports, and classified under the category of Marine HFACS 
framework, which consists of three levels: organisational influences, precondition for 
unsafe acts, and unsafe acts. The Marine HFACS analysis identified the relationships 
between contributing factors of each level and the accident type of machinery failure, 
grounding, flooding, contact, and collision. 
The finding from this study reveals that the preponderant contributory factor to the 
passenger ship accident was identified, and specific causal factors need further 
development. Additionally, the understanding of the accident trend through the causal 
relationship analysis assists to take measures to prevent the recurrence of the 
accident. 
 
KEYWORDS: Domestic passenger ship, Human error, HFACS, Maritime-HFACS   
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
 
The maritime safety is probably the most significant object in the shipping industry, 
particularly in the passenger shipping sector due to its unique characteristics that 
need more attention for safety. It is notable that the global ferry industry transports 
about 2.1 billion passengers per year and ferry transportation is important to millions 
of people as part of their daily lives (DNV-GL, 2016). However, world accident rate for 
passenger ship still stays the certain level indicating red signal, while the passenger 
shipping sector has been enlarged their portion among shipping industry each year 
(EMSA, 2016). As the passenger ship is engaged in the service business, the 
satisfaction of passenger could be the priority consideration to the passenger shipping 
company. For this reason, despite difficult circumstance such as heavy weather, the 
passenger ship could be forced to entry/departure. Especially the domestic passenger 
ferry does not make sure of enough time for maintenance of equipment due to the 
frequent entry/departure. Nevertheless, since the passenger ship is carrying dozens 
and thousands of people, the severity of accidents is so great that it is natural to pay 
more attention to the passenger ship safety. 
International Maritime Organization (IMO), which is established for the purpose of 
maritime safety, is also making efforts for safer shipping and marine environmental 
protection through enacting mandatory instruments. They have adopted the 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) after the catastrophe 
of passenger ship Titanic in 1912. Apart from the development of technical regulations, 
the loss of the Herald of Free Enterprise brought about the approach to the human 
element as the cause of accidents and resulted in the International Safety 
Management (ISM) Code which was made compulsory throughout the 1974 SOLAS 
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in 1998, by stipulating international standards for the safety management system of 
shipping company for the safe operation of ships and for pollution prevention. 
Recently, the world has been alerted once again about the safety of passenger ships 
as a result of the Costa Concordia accident and the Sewol accident. However, there 
are still many serious and minor passenger ship accidents over the world due to lack 
of fundamental risk reduction or measures to diminish. On 16 August 2013, a roll-
on/roll-off ferry called St. Thomas Aquinas collided with a cargo ship near the southern 
Philippine island of Mindanao mainly caused by the human error of the Captain. On 1 
June 2015, the 76-meter-long passenger ship called Dong Fang Zhi Xing capsized 
and sank on the Yangtze River in the Wuhan, China. Total 442 deaths were confirmed 
and 12 rescued after the accident. The cause of the accident was the massive 
downburst in the thunderstorm and ignorance of weather precautions by Captain of 
the ship. 
The aftermath of the Sewol accident, the Government of Republic of Korea has 
focused on improving ship particulars (e.g., Limit of ship’s age and alteration) and the 
reliability of maritime safety system, but the accident rate is continuously increasing. 
The vessels that had been in the accident, excluding fishing vessels, were 562 ships 
in 2010 yet, they increased to 741 ships in 2015, especially for the passenger ships, 
the number of accident vessels has tripled, accounting for 66 ships in 2015 compared 
to 2010 (KMST, 2016). 
In that case, why we could not considerably reduce the risk of accidents, despite all 
these improvements. Rothblum (2000) noted the reason is that ship particulars and 
safety system reliability are a relatively small part of the safety equation. As the 
maritime safety system is constructed by the human, the failure in the safety system 
would be a human error, not a mechanical error. The numerous studies also clarify 
that human error contributes to 80 - 96% of the accident (Aas, 2008; Rasmussen, 
1997; Rothblum, 2000). Therefore, it is important that to understand in detail about 
human error causal factors contributing to the previous accidents in order to set the 
appropriate controls in place (Madigan, Golightly & Madders, 2016).   
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Based on Reason’s (2000) study, the human error problem can be viewed in two ways: 
the person approach and the system approach. The person approach concentrates 
on the unsafe behaviour such as negligence, moral weakness, and violence. The 
countermeasures considered as reducing unwanted variability in human behaviour. 
The system approach focuses on the condition of an individual workplace and the 
organizational process and human errors consider as not a cause but a result of 
accidents. The countermeasure is the system defence. When an accident happened, 
the point is to find out why and how the system has a failure. 
 
The Sewol sinking accident, which has been entangled not only by the negligence of 
the crew but also by the company organisation and the absurdity of the social system, 
has led to the vibrant discussion and study about the systematic approach to the 
marine accident. The Korean maritime industry recognized the importance of 
organisational system and is actively studying the organisational factor that affects 
the work environment of the ship rather than the simple mistake of the seafarers (Baik, 
Park, Choi, & Oh, 2016; Kim, 2015; Yoon, 2014). 
 
However, while the unsafe act of workers can be found out easily through the personal 
approach, the deficiencies of organisational procedure often hidden beneath the main 
factor. Reason (1990a) distinguished these two kinds of error: active errors and latent 
errors. Active errors, whose consequences are revealed almost immediately, but 
latent failures may lie dormant within the system for a long time. Although the workers 
frequently may make some errors in the process of recovering the failure of the 
system, the root cause of an accident has been laid in the system before the active 
errors were executed. 
 
For this reason, it is important for the accident investigators to find out all contributing 
factors not only active errors but also latent factors laid in concealments within the 
organisational system. By eliminating the error causes identified thorough accident 
investigations, it is necessary to prevent repeated occurrences of the same disasters, 
prevent similar accidents in the future, and improve safety management and safety 
systems. On the contrary, insufficient accident investigation reports can lead to the 
wrong lessons by committing errors during the process of cause analysing and by 
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failing to identify underlying causes of accidents, which can be a threat to the safety 
system. Therefore, a study of analysis of the active failures and latent failures 
contained in the existing investigation reports may be significant in identifying the 
human error causal factors and it could be the unique opportunity to review the quality 
and the depth of information of the accident investigation report. 
 
 
1.2. Objectives 
 
In order to analyse the human error causal factors on the passenger ship accident 
investigation reports, this paper presents an application of the Human Factors 
Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) framework. The purpose of this study to 
distinguish the active failure and latent failures on the accident reports, and to analyse 
the prevailing factor and accident trend. By analysing the accident pattern, this paper 
provides the recommendations for diminishing human error on the passenger ship. 
Linked to this, the paper will find answers to the following questions. 
i) Is the HFACS tool effective to identify the active errors and latent failures in the 
organisational system on the accident investigation reports? 
ii) Are there any differences within causal factors according to the different 
categories of accident and is it possible to identify the accident mechanism? 
iii) Do the accident investigation reports contain sufficient information in order to 
identify the latent conditions? 
 
 
1.3. Scope of work  
 
This paper concentrates on the actual and latent factors that threaten the safety of 
passenger ship. For this purpose, it utilises 30 cases of passenger ship accident 
investigation reports in Korea during the period of 2014-2015. These investigation 
reports are obtained from the Korean Maritime Safety Tribunal (KMST). This paper 
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will study the method of analysis of the human factors that have been investigated in 
various industrial fields up to now and the model to analyse the cause of the accident 
through this analysis methodology. The utility of the HFACS selected by the 
methodology of this study will also be verified by the process of analysis of 
investigation reports. The contents of each chapter are as follows. 
  
Chapter 1 presents the motivation to study the actual and latent factors that contribute 
to the passenger ship accident. It informs the seriousness of passenger ship accident 
and highlights that the exact identification of causal factors by a thorough analysis of 
accident can detect the underlying factors and prevent the recurrence of the same or 
similar accident in the future. To clarify this, the aim and direction of this study are 
presented.   
 
Chapter 2 describes the status of Korean domestic passenger ship transport and 
maritime accidents. It will clarify the definition and division of passenger ships defined 
by the Korean domestic law and explain the present condition of domestic passenger 
ships and operator. Further to this, based on statistics of marine accidents, it will 
examine the current situation and causes of accidents. 
 
Chapter 3 reviews the previous different theories and researches about human errors 
and accident causation models. Among the human factor analysis methodologies, the 
general concept of HFACS and Maritime HFACS selected as the main model for this 
study will be introduced in detail. 
 
Chapter 4 provides the information about the methodology of this study. It describes 
the database of passenger ship accident investigation reports collected for this study, 
and how to classify the identified contributing factors in these accidents and integrate 
these factors into categories of HFACS framework.  
 
Chapter 5 covers the results from the analysis of accident investigation reports based 
on the HFACS framework. It reviews the outcomes of the analysis to see if we can 
find the answers to the questions proposed in the Objectives and discuss the 
implications of these results, including the limitation of this study. 
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Lastly, chapter 6 presents the conclusion of this study based on the analysis of 
HFACS framework. In addition, recommendations regarding the accident 
investigation reports will be given for the improvement of passenger ship safety. 
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2. Passenger ship transport and status of maritime accidents 
 
2.1. Passenger ship transport 
 
2.1.1. Concept and classification of passenger ship 
 
(1) Concept of passenger ship 
 
According to the Korean Ship Safety Act, Article 2 (Definition), passenger ship has 
defined a ship designed specifically to transport 13 fare-paying passengers or more. 
More precisely, the term of passengers means “persons on board a ship, except the 
following persons: (a) Crew; (b) An infant under one year of age; (c) A person 
prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, who is temporarily 
on board, such as a customs officer”. Passenger ships defined in this way are the 
vessel used in “marine passenger transportation services”, and it is necessary to 
clarify the range of passenger ships used in this study by looking at the concept and 
kind of maritime passenger transport business. 
In the Korean Maritime Transport Act, Article 2 (Definition), "marine passenger 
transportation services means such business as transporting passengers or 
passengers and goods by any passenger ship or any wing-in-ground ship as defined 
in Article 1-2 (1) 1 of the Ship Act (hereinafter referred to as "passenger ship, etc.") 
on the sea or along inland waterways contiguous to the sea or such business as 
providing ancillary services to the former, which refers to any business other than 
harbour transport-related business as prescribed in Article 2 (4) of the Harbour 
Transport Business Act”. 
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Furthermore, in the Maritime Transport Act, Article 3 (Categories of Services), Marine 
passenger transportation services is classified into the following categories: i) 
Scheduled coastal passenger transportation services, ii) Non-scheduled coastal 
passenger transportation services, iii) Scheduled overseas passenger transportation 
services, iv) Non-scheduled overseas passenger transportation services, v) Cruise 
passenger transportation services, and vi) Combined marine passenger 
transportation services.  
 
Among the above-mentioned marine passenger transportation services, the vessels 
used for “Scheduled coastal passenger transportation services” and “Non-scheduled 
coastal passenger transportation services” are generally referred to as “Domestic 
passenger ships.” In this study, domestic passenger ships will be targeted, and this 
will be abbreviated as passenger ships. 
 
(2) Classification of Passenger Ship 
 
The purpose of the stipulation and classification of passenger ship in the regulations 
such as Ship Safety Act is that to guide, supervise and regulate the passenger ships 
which are required to secure the safety of passengers’ lives compared to the cargo 
ships.  
 
Passenger ships can be further classified as shown below, based on speed or type of 
transport. Firstly, the passenger ship that utilized only for the purpose of 
accommodating passengers and not carrying cargo or vehicles. Passenger ships are 
subdivided again based on their speeds as follows1 (Park, 2015). 
 
i) General Ship: Passenger ship with a speed of fewer than 15 knots 
ii) High-Speed Craft: Passenger ship with a speed of more than 15 knots and less 
than 20 knots  
                                                 
1 Definitions for classifying passenger ships by speed or type are not prescribed by Korean national 
law. However, the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries divides passenger ships on the basis of speed, etc. 
in “the regulations on the notification of rates and fares for domestic passenger ship” issued based on 
the Marine Transport Act, and specifies separate fares. 
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iii) Super Speed Craft: Passenger ship with a speed of more than 20 knots and 
less than 35 knots  
iv) Super High-Speed Craft: Passenger ship with a speed of 35 knots or more 
 
Secondly, cargo ferry that in addition to transporting passengers are also utilized to 
carry vehicles from one destination to another. Cargo ferry is divided into Enclosed 
Ro-Pax and Opened Ro-Pax depending on the type of ship (MOAF, 2015b).   
 
i) Enclosed Ro-Pax (Roll-on Roll-off Passenger) means a car ferry that can load 
or carry a vehicle in the enclosed vehicle area as it is used for land 
transportation.  
ii) Opened Ro-Pax means a car ferry that can load or carry a vehicle in the opened 
vehicle area as it is used for land transportation. 
 
Figure 2-1. Enclosed Ro-Pax (Left) and Opened Ro-Pax (Right) 
   
 
Most of the passenger ships in Korea correspond to such transportation ships as 
above, but there is another type of passenger ship, cruise ships. Thirdly, the cruise 
ship is a passenger ship with convenient facilities such as accommodation, food and 
beverage facilities, amusement facilities and so on. Passengers on cruise ships will 
give great significance to the boarding per se, but in the case of marine passenger 
transportation, the main purpose of the vessel is to be used as a means of physical 
transport for passenger, so that this study will focus on the function and system of 
transportation for the passenger.  
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2.1.2. Status of passenger ship transport 
 
(1) Status of passenger ship operators 
 
As of the end of 2016, there is total 58 passenger ship service operators, managing 
167 passenger ships, committing 108 service routes in the coastal of Korea. Figure 
2-2 shows the presence of service routes of the domestic passenger ship, and Table 
2-1 presents the number of service lines and operating vessels over the past three 
years. Among the 108 routes, there are 81 general lines operated by the operators as 
profitability is secured, and 27 subsidized lines2 that are supported as a semi-public 
system by the government due to the lack of profitability. Compared to the record in 
2014, while the service route increased by 13 routes on 95 routes, one operating ship 
decreased. This can attribute to an increase in the number of operation required per 
vessel.  
 
Table 2-1. Number of service lines and operating vessels (KSA, 2017) 
 
Number of Lines Number of Vessels Number 
of 
Company Total 
General 
Lines 
Subsidized 
Lines 
Total 
General 
Lines 
Subsidized 
Lines 
2016 108 81 27 167 140 27 67(58)* 
2015 112 85 27 169 143 26 69(60) 
2014 95 69 26 168 142 26 69(62) 
Note: * exclude duplicated company 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 A subsidized line means a route which receives government aid for the operating loss. In 
case of small island area, due to the absolute shortage of passengers and low fares, shipping 
operators are avoiding the operation of passenger ships. In order to provide transportation 
convenience for those residents, the government orders the ship to be operated, and support 
subsidy to the shipping operators. 
 １１ 
  
Figure 2-2. Service routes of Korean domestic passenger ship (KSA, 2017) 
 
 
For the subsidized lines, however, since the government supports the deficit of 
operation, the operators tend to neglect effort to improve their balance and service 
quality. Furthermore, unlike international passenger transport service operators, 
domestic passenger transport service operators are relatively small-scale company 
and low profitable (Kang, 2016). 
 
According to the report of KSA (2017), 8 of the 58 domestic passenger transport 
service operators with less than 300 million won in the capital amount to 13.8% of the 
total. Figure 2-3 shows that the number of operators per capital amount, and Figure 
2-4 describes the number of operators per possessing number of vessels. The 
number of operators with less than a billion won ($ 900,000) in capital is 32, 
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accounting for 55.2% of the total, and the number of companies operated by one or 
two vessels is 32, accounting for 55% of the total. For this reason, the plowback for 
the ship safety management is so small that it is difficult to assure the passenger ship 
safety.  
 
Figure 2-3. Number of operators by capital amounts (KSA, 2017) 
 
 
Figure 2-4. Number of operators by passenger ship retention (KSA, 2017) 
 
  
(2) Status of Passenger Ship 
 
As seen in Figure 2-5, the ratio of passenger ships with more than 20 years of age 
was 14% in 2011 but increased to 27% in 2016. In terms of the number of vessels, 
the total number of vessels in 2011 and 2016 was same as 167, while the number of 
vessels with more than 20 years doubled from 23 to 46 vessels.  
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In addition, there are seven vessels over 25 years of age in 2016 since the maximum 
age of passenger ships has increased from 20 year to 30 year with the amendment 
of the Enforcement Regulations for Shipping Act in 2009. The regulation for the age 
of ship amended once again after the Sewol accident in 2014 by reducing the ship-
year standard for cargo ferry from 30 year to 25 year. However, the ship-year standard 
for passenger ship only for passenger has been maintained the 30 year (KMST, 2016).  
 
Figure 2-5. Number of passenger ship per ship year (KSA, 2017) 
 
 
According to a result of the study (KMIFT, 2008), the passenger ship’s age is not 
related to the occurrence of the maritime accident, especially machinery failure. 
However, the higher the ship’s age, the more it is to affect the normal operation of the 
safety device, such as an emergency stop device. Also, due to vibration of hull, there 
is a high possibility of fire onboard caused by damage of fuel oil and lubricating oil of 
piping system. Therefore, the ship safety can be maintained at a considerable level 
when strengthening the ship management system and investing in maintenance and 
repair of the machine. 
 
In terms of the number of passengers of ships in Korea, Figure 2-6 shows the trend 
of utilization ratio of passenger ship since 2011. 16 million passengers used the 
passenger ship in 2013 before the Sewol accident, and 14 million passengers in 2014 
and then slightly increased to 15.4 million as of the end of 2016. Looking at the 
average usage rate over the past five years, it shows an increase of 1.9%. Among 
them, general users (except island area resident) are 76% of the total passengers, 
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which is 11.7 million. It means that more than one-third of the whole population is on-
boarding passenger ships at least once a year (KSA, 2017). 
 
Figure 2-6. Number of passengers per year (KSA, 2017) 
 
 
Regarding the proportion by the type of passenger as shown in Figure 2-7, opened 
Ro-Pax occupied more than half of the total. The ratio increased from 54% in 2011 to 
61% in 2016, accounting for 90 and 102 vessels, respectably. Following this, 21 
General Passenger Ships (13%), 16 Super High Speed Craft (10%), 8 Super Speed 
Craft (5%), and 5 High Speed Craft (3%) formed, as of the end of 2016. The proportion 
of passengers by ship type showed a similar pattern according to the ratio of ship type, 
with the highest rank of nearly nine million passengers on Opened Ro-Pax (KSA, 
2017).  
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Figure 2-7. Number of passengers and passenger ships by ship type (KSA, 2017) 
 
 
(3) Status of Seafarers on Passenger Ship 
As of the end of 2016, 824 seafarers are working on passenger ships. As described 
in Table 2-2 below, the number of seafarers has increased steadily from 751 in 2005 
to 988 in 2013, but it dropped to 774 in 2014 and then increased again. Out of 824 
seafarers as of 2016, officers account for a high proportion of 565 people (68.6%), of 
which the ratio of deck and engine officer is similar. In the case of ratings, the crew 
belonging to deck section accounts for 73.4%. Especially, among the 167 passenger 
ships, the small ship less than 500 tons occupies the majority with 139 vessels. 
 
Table 2-2. Number of seafarers engaging in domestic passenger ships (Korea Seafarer’s 
Welfare and Employment Center (KOSWEC), 2017) 
Year 
Grand 
Total 
Officers Ratings 
Total Deck Engine Total Deck Engine Cook 
2016 824 565 314 251 259 190 64 5 
2015 765 544 298 246 221 165 48 8 
2014 774 560 309 251 214 163 48 3 
2013 988 699 383 316 289 196 72 21 
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2005 751 499 275 224 252 149 94 9 
 
 
According to the statistics of the KOSWEC as shown in Table 2-3, there are currently 
167 passenger ships, and with an average of 4.9 seafarers per ship. Compared to 
other vessels, the number of passenger ship seafarers per ship is rather smaller than 
that of 8.8 persons for the chemical tanker, 8.2 persons for LPG carriers, 6.4 persons 
for the general cargo vessel, and 5.1 persons for oil tankers. In addition, the number 
of passenger ship seafarers is much lower than that of 14.8 persons per ocean-going 
passenger ship. It can be seen that a few seafarers on domestic passenger ships are 
in a harsh working condition compared to other domestic ship types and ocean-going 
passenger ships. 
 
Table 2-3. Average number of seafarers on domestic vessels (KOSWEC, 2017) 
Ship Type Vessels Seafarers 
Seafarers  
per vessel 
Chemical Tanker 46 404 8.8 
LPG 15 123 8.2 
General Cargo Vessel 201 1293 6.4 
Oil Tanker 168 862 5.1 
Bunker Supply Vessel 64 227 3.5 
Domestic Passenger Ship 167 824 4.9 
Ocean-going Passenger Ship 8 119 14.8 
 
 
The aging of the seafarers can also be a threat to passenger ships. As described in 
the following Table 2-4 of the age range of seafarers on the domestic vessels, while 
25.5% of those over 50 years old and 51.9% of those over 60 years old, only 5.4% 
are under 30 years old. However, compared to year of 2010, the younger-than-25-
year-old seafarers have increased from 2.0% to 2.4%. The proportion of elderly 
seafarers has increased compared with young seafarers. Regarding the age of 
seafarers, as older group over the age of 60 will soon be out of ship operation, it is 
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urgent to foster and provide the young seafarers to have a positive effect for the 
maritime field. 
 
 
 
Table 2-4. Status of seafarers’ age group on domestic ships (KOSWEC, 2017) 
 < 25 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 >60 Total 
2010 Total 166 138 521 1071 3,073 3,093 8,062 
 Ratio 2.0 1.7 6.4 13.3 38.1 38.3 100.0 
2016 Total 189 239 521 821 2,006 4,078 7,854 
 Ratio 2.4 3.0 6.6 10.5 25.5 51.9 100.0 
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2.2. Status of Maritime Accident 
 
2.2.1 Definition and kind of marine accident 
 
(1) Definition of marine accident 
 
According to the Annex of IMO Res. A. 884(21), Article 4 (Definition), Marine casualty 
means “an event, or a sequence of events, that has resulted in any of the following 
which has occurred directly in connection with the operations of a ship: 
 
(a)  the death of, or serious injury to, a person; 
(b)  the loss of a person from a ship; 
(c)  the loss, presumed loss or abandonment of a ship; 
(d)  material damage to a ship; 
(e)  the stranding or disabling of a ship, or the involvement of a ship in a collision; 
(f)  material damage to marine infrastructure external to a ship, that could seriously 
endanger the safety of the ship, another ship or an individual; or 
(g)  severe damage to the environment, or the potential for severe damage to the 
environment, brought about by the damage of a ship or ships” (IMO, 1999). 
 
When we look at the Korean Act on the Investigation of and Inquiry into Marine 
Accidents Article 2 (Definitions), the term of marine accident means “any of the 
following accidents, which happen at sea and in the inland waters: 
 
(a) An accident in which a person dies, disappears or is injured, in connection with 
the structure, equipment or operation of ships; 
(b) An accident which causes damage to a ship or shore or marine facilities, in 
connection with the operation of ships; 
(c) An accident in which a ship is lost, derelict or missing; 
(d) An accident in which a ship collides with another ship, is stranded, capsizes or 
sinks or it is impossible to steer a ship; 
(e) An accident that causes marine pollution damage, in connection with the 
operation of ships;” (MOAF, 2014). 
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Compared to the definition of marine casualty used in IMO Resolution (IMO, ) it is 
founded that the meaning of marine accident used in the Korean Act on the 
Investigation of and Inquiry into Marine Accidents is reflected in the same with 
internationally accepted meaning.  
 
(2) Kind of Marine accident 
 
Based on the annual accident report of KMST (2016), it is intended to analyse the 
status of marine accidents and causes of marine accidents, specifically, passenger 
ship accidents. 
 
The kind of maritime accident that KMST has classified is as follow: collision, contact, 
grounding, capsize, fire/explosion, sunk, machinery damage, fatalities, and hindrance 
to safe navigation. Table 2-5 is shown the frequency of passenger ship accidents by 
accident category during the period of 2012 - 2016. The most occupied type of 
accident is machinery damage, accounting for 74 out of total 243 accidents, and the 
following accidents are the hindrance to safe navigation (53), collision (32), contact 
(19), grounding (9), fire/explosion (6), fatalities (6), capsized (2), and others are 42 
cases.  
 
Table 2-5. Frequency of passenger ship accidents by accident category (KMST, 2016)  
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total 
Collision 8 5 5 5 9 32 
Contact 5 1 3 5 5 19 
Grounding - 1 5 3 - 9 
Capsized - - 1 1 - 2 
Fire/Explosion 1 2 1 1 1 6 
Sunk - - - - - - 
Machinery 
Damage 
7 5 16 25 21 74 
Fatalities - - 2 2 2 6 
Hindrance to Safe 
Navigation 
6 8 11 12 16 53 
Others 5 7 7 12 11 42 
Total 32 29 51 66 65 243 
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2.2.2. Statistics and causes of maritime accident 
 
(1) Statistics of maritime accident 
 
The maritime traffic safety environment in Korea coastal sea is so critical that there 
are many risks of marine accidents. The coastal waters are complicated and narrow 
in geographical form, and are often weathered by typhoons in summer, low pressure 
in winter, and heavy fog. In addition, marine traffic volume is increasing continuously 
in a limited space. While the number of high-speed crafts, very-large ships with sub-
standard vessels is increasing, the qualities of the crew members operating on these 
vessels and the motivation for boarding are also continuously deteriorating (Cho, 
2002). 
 
Due to these poor marine surroundings, recently the rate of marine casualties is 
increasing each year compared to the number of vessels registered in Korea. As seen 
in Figure 2-8, even though the registered vessels continue reduction trend from 
84,466 in 2012 to 76,500 in 2015, the number of accidental vessels is raising up from 
1,306 in 2013 to 2,549 in 2016, and the passenger ship also shows the same trend of 
increasing from 29 to 65 in recent years. During the period of 2012 to 2016, there 
have been 9,636 of accidental vessels, averaging 1,927 marine accidental vessels 
annually, of which passenger ship accidents account for 2.52%, with 49 accidents 
annually on average (KMST, 2016). 
 
Remarkably, the number of marine accidental vessel in 2013 dropped significantly to 
1,306, approximately 600 vessels fewer than the average annual maritime accidental 
vessels, which had recorded over 1,800 vessels at the previous year. This can be 
contributed to “The Project to Reduce Marine Accidents by 30%,” of the Ministry of 
Oceans and Fisheries and the Korea Coast Guard (KCG). The Project has focused 
on the prevention of marine accidents, of which fishing boats and small ships less 
than 100 tons accounted for approximately 66% and 71.1% of maritime accidents, 
respectively (Kim, 2015).    
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Figure 2-8. Status of Marine Accident in Korea (KMST, 2016)  
 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total 
Registered Vessels(A) 84,466 80,647 77,730 76,500 -* - 
No. of Accident vessels(B) 1,854 1,306 1,565 2,362 2,549 9,636 
Rate of Accident (B/A) 2.19% 1.62% 2.01% 3.09% - - 
Passenger Ship Accident 32 29 51 66 65 243 
Note: * Not recorded 
 
 
In addition, Figure 2-9 describes the marine accidents rate by accident area over the 
past five years. The accident area was divided as ports, channels, territorial Seas, 
and open seas.  Overall, the accident rate in the territorial waters is considerably 
higher than that of open seas. The average of marine accidents occurred in the open 
seas in the last five years is 15.5% whilst that within the ports and territorial waters is 
84.5%. Therefore, it can be concluded that the geographical area should pay attention 
to coastal waters (KMST, 2016).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1,854
1,306
1,565
2,362
2,549
84,466
80,647
77,730 76,500
50,000
55,000
60,000
65,000
70,000
75,000
80,000
85,000
90,000
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
4,500
5,000
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Number of accident vessels Number of registered vessels
 ２２ 
  
Figure 2-9 Status of maritime accidents by accident area (Source: KMST, 2016) 
 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Average 
Ports, 
Approaching 
Channels 
171 
(10.9%) 
126 
(11.5%) 
145 
(10.9%) 
308 
(14.7%) 
335 
(14.5%) 
217 
(12.9%) 
Territorial 
Seas 
1,134 
(72.1%) 
769 
(70.4%) 
942 
(70.8%) 
1,535 
(73.1%) 
1,636 
(70.9%) 
1203 
(71.6%) 
Open Seas 
268 
(17.0%) 
198 
(18.1%) 
243 
(18.3%) 
258 
(12.3%) 
336 
(14.6%) 
261 
(15.5%) 
Total 1,573 1,093 1,330 2,101 2,307 1,681 
 
 
 (2) Cause of Maritime Accident 
 
According to KMST, the major causes of marine accident are following; operational 
error such as violation of collision regulations, negligence of lookout, insufficient 
courses checking, and poor fixing/keeping of courses, handling mistakes or 
inappropriate maintenance of machinery, inappropriate performance for prevention of 
accident, inappropriate working condition, defect of safety, inappropriate facilities, 
defects of hull/engine room machinery, inappropriate management of ship operation, 
force majeure of the sea, others, and unknown cause. 
 
Table 2-6 describes the passenger ship accident frequency by the cause of accident 
during the period of 2012 – 2016. The primary cause involved in the registered 
0
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passenger ship accident is the operation error, with 44 cases. Of which, the violation 
of general navigational laws occupied the highest frequency, accounting for 26 cases. 
The next most frequent cause of accident was the inappropriate maintenance or 
handling mistakes of machinery, with 40 cases during the past five years. Other 
causes of violation of collision regulations, non-observance of order, inappropriate 
takeover, inappropriate performance for prevention of accident, defects of hull/engine 
room machinery, and force majeure of the sea were found one case, respectively, 
including defect of safety with 2 cases. 
 
Table 2-6 Frequency of passenger ship accidents per accident causes (KMST, 2016) 
Accident Causes Frequency 
Operational 
Error 
Violation of collision regulations 1 
Violation of general regulations (lookout, fixing of ship’s position, and 
fixing/keeping of courses, etc.) 
26 
Poor preparation of departure (securing openings, checking of 
loading condition, Furnishing of Chart & Publication, etc.) 
12 
Non-observance of order, inappropriate takeover 1 
Others of operational error  4 
Operation Error Sub-total 44 
Inappropriate maintenance or handling mistakes of machinery 40 
Inappropriate performance (Loading/unloading, working on board, etc.)  for 
prevention of accident  
1 
Inappropriate working condition (Rest time, maintenance of facilities for prevention of 
danger) 
- 
Defect of safety (Structure or quality of machinery) 2 
Inappropriate facilities (Waterway, port, navigation aids) - 
Defects of hull/engine room machinery (Electronics, cargo handling, etc.) 1 
Inappropriate management of ship operation - 
Force majeure of the sea 1 
Others - 
Unknown cause - 
Total 89 
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On the other hand, none of the cause of the Inappropriate working condition, 
Inappropriate facilities, and Inappropriate management of ship operation was not 
identified. Though these causes have not had an immediate impact on the accident, 
it could be the underlying conditions which can lead to the active failure such as 
operational errors or handling mistakes. Therefore, it is necessary to look deeply into 
the investigation report, and if it reveals that these causes also affected to the accident 
even indirectly, they should be considered to eliminate the potential risk factors.  
 
2.3 Summary 
 
This chapter provided the current status of passenger ships and related accidents in 
Korea. In summary, most of the passenger ship operators are small scaled with a 
small number of ships and capital amount, and the year of those ships are mostly over 
than 15 years. Moreover, the average number of seafarers who are employed on the 
passenger ships are much less than ships in the different type of domestic vessel or 
international voyage passenger ship. Current identified issues of passenger ships 
obviously show the correlation with the underperformance of Korean passenger ships. 
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3. Theoretical frame of human error 
 
3.1. Historical analysis of human error  
 
As the complexities confronting the people in their work or social relations has begun 
to emerge, behaviourism researchers of psychology have studied the realm of ‘human 
factors’ that deal with the relationships of human and human, human and machine, 
system, procedure, and human and environment to understand the complicated 
situation. This study has gradually developed into the interdisciplinary research and 
applied in different sphere including business administration, medicine, engineering 
and so on. Human error is a phenomenon that results from inappropriate behaviour 
in human interaction with these peripheral factors and has implication for the 
degradation of performance, safety, and efficiency of the system.  
 
Generally, the human error has been considered the cause of an accident and to be 
in the inaccurate assessments, wrong decisions, and bad judgments. The classic 
approach to the accident causation originated from Heinrich (1931), which is a 
“Domino Theory,” emphasizing the chain of adverse event. This model has affected 
to the change of focus on from the unsafe working condition to human error. The five 
factors of Domino Theory are:  
 Social environment and Ancestry  
 Fault of Person 
 Unsafe acts and conditions (Mechanical and psychical error) 
 Accident 
 Injury  
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Figure 3-1. Domino model of accident causation (modified from Heinrich (1931), Sabet, Aadal, 
Jamshidi, and Rad, 2013) 
 
Based on the domino model, “accident” is the one factor that leads to an injury, and 
occurs only because of “Mechanical error”. For this reason, Heinrich proposed that 
the accident can be prevented by removing the unsafe act/condition or 
mechanical/physical hazard among the errors, and they should be received the most 
attention. However, this theory has a weakness that only individuals are responsible 
for the accident, not considering the problem of social environment or organisation 
(Sabet, Aadal, Jamshidi, and Rad, 2013).   
To supplement Heinrich’s theory, Bird and Loftus (1976) acknowledged that the 
accident can be prevented by eliminating the basic cause rather than an immediate 
cause, and represented the accident occurrence process by the following five steps:   
 Lack of control-management (inadequate program, inadequate program 
standard, inadequate compliance to standard) 
 Basic cause-origins (personal and job factor) 
 Immediate causes-symptoms (sub-standard act and condition)  
 Incident (contact with energy and substance) 
 Injury-damage-loss  
Bird recognized that since immediate causes are only a symptom of the basic causes, 
eliminating the defects of control or management that suppress the occurrence of root 
causes is a more fundamental prevention measure (WZS & ETC, n.d.a.). 
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Figure 3-2. Updated Domino sequence of accident causation theory (Bird, 1976) 
 
After that, as the point of view of human error changes, many researchers have 
perceived that human error is a symptom of the system and its design, and tried to 
find how people's assessments and actions made sense at the time, given the 
circumstances that surrounded them (Dekker, 2001; Lee, 2002; Reason, 1990a; 
Woods, Dekker & Cook, 1994). The typical model of human factor and elements 
showing the concept of systems perspective is the SHELL model.  
Hawkins's SHELL model (1983), modified SHEL model first developed by Elywyn 
Edward (1972), constructed a human factor model, which polysynthetically and 
systematically shows the interaction between humans and systems. The center of the 
SHELL model, "L", is human (liveware), which is regarded as the subjects that perform 
their duties. It is the most flexible and effective in the system, but it depends on the 
individual’s ability to perform their work, which can cause many differences and 
restrictions. “H” is hardware, which represents all devices operated by humans. "S" is 
software, which is not an external element of the system, but rather laws, procedures 
and computer programs. "E" is an environment that refers to all surrounding elements 
of the system such as lighting, humidity, and temperature. Finally, "L" represents 
another human who affects work (HP Repository, 2012).  
Regarding human error, human factors related to center located L include personality, 
attitude, and motivation. If there is a lack of understanding of relations between “L” 
and each factor, errors may be caused. In L-H model, poor user experience occurs in 
the man-machine system. Errors due to incorrect regulations and procedures can be 
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explained in L-S model. The error in L-E model is due to work circumstance or weather 
factors. In the L-L model, errors occur due to miscommunication among workers, lack 
of cooperation, misunderstandings, emotions, and inadequate work loading.  
However, this model is only constructed to understand human factors, so that it has 
a limitation that it cannot cover the interface which is external human factors (H-H, H-
E, S-H) (HP Repository, 2012). 
Figure 3-3. Hawkins's SHELL model (1983)  
 
(Source: http://www. tgpilotrecruitment. Com /?page_id =78) 
 
The analysis of human error is largely divided into quantitative analysis and qualitative 
analysis. Quantitative analysis is a method to determine the occurrence probability of 
human error in a specific work, but it is not suitable for the planning of the 
countermeasure for prevention of recurrence of the accident because the description 
of the cause of the accident is not presented. The qualitative analysis compensating 
the defect of quantitative analysis is an in-depth analysis of the actual process of the 
event, so it is possible to classify the human error, to identify the cause, and to 
establish countermeasures (Park, 1993).  
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In the qualitative analysis, the focus has been on the analysis method considering the 
cognitive processes of workers. By replacing repetitive, time-intensive tasks with the 
high-tech automation system, the role of workers has been changed from the actor to 
the information processer that performs the task of resolving the problem through 
decision-making. Accordingly, there is an increasing demand for the development of 
error analysis method considering human decision-making process (Choi, Kim Y., & 
Kim C., 2002).  
 
Representative models that approach human errors from a cognitive perspective 
include the model of human information processing by Wickens & Hollands (2000) 
and the Generic Error Modelling System (GEMS) by Reason (1990b). The model of 
Wickens & Hollands (2000) is classified the type of human error in terms of information 
processing. Errors that arise in the planning phase occur in the perception and 
cognitive processes, which can occur when the goal or situation is mistakenly 
recognized. These errors are caused by exceeding the limits of memory or by bias 
and may be due to the perceptual problems or cognitive vulnerabilities. Specifically, 
mistakes are divided into knowledge-based mistakes and rule-based mistakes.  
 
Knowledge-based mistakes occur in case of excess information or a lack of 
knowledge to interpret the information. Rule-based mistakes are errors in rules, 
procedures, etc., and can be divided into two cases: a misjudgment of rules, 
procedures, etc., and a case where a wrong rule is applied to the current situation. 
Errors in the memory phase happen in a form that is not followed the interactions that 
occur in various processes due to the lost in memory. It is not a mistake in behavior, 
but an unconscious mistake and the main cause is excessive work or interference. 
Errors in the execution phase are cases where the situation recognition is correct but 
the behavior is different from the intended behavior. The main cause is that to deviate 
from the repetitive behavior or habituated behaviors are not carefully handled 
(Wickens & Hollands, 2000). 
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Figure 3-4  Model of Human Information Process (Modified from Wickens & Hollands, 2000) 
 
 
The Generic Error Modelling System (GEMS) of Reason (1990b) divided human error 
into four categories: slip by attention failure, lapse by memory failure, mistake and 
violation of the failure of intended behavior.  It is based heavily on Rasmussen’s 
(1983) three major categories of errors: skill-based slips and lapses, rule-based 
mistakes, and knowledge-based mistakes (SRK model). Slips are unintentional 
behaviors that are caused by lack of attention or excessive attention in the cognitive 
process or are caused by automated behavior in the process of execution. Lapses by 
memory failure occur due to a mere memory failure by unintended behavior. It is more 
difficult to identify than a mistake, more dangerous due to the internality, and can be 
exacerbated when you think that further checking is unnecessary after completing a 
task. The rule-based mistakes result from the selection of an inappropriate rule by the 
distorted view of the state. The knowledge-based mistakes are due to the inaccurate 
comprehension of the system, ascertainment bias, and overconfidence. A violation is 
a case of intentionally deviating from the rules and procedures for safe and efficient 
work.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ３１ 
  
Figure 3-5. The Generic Error Modelling System (GEMS) of Reason (1990b)  
 
(Source: https://www.maifa.org/resolution/resolutions/A.884(21)_APP_2_1.htm) 
 
 
Reason (1990b) also systematically described the accident process with swiss 
cheese with small holes in the middle of the accident. The hole means the deficiencies 
of organizational levels. In this theory, Reason presented the theoretical basis that if 
the accident occurred due to a series of human factors, the human error should be 
extended to the overall problem including the organizational and regulatory factor.  
 
Accordingly, there are four stages that happen adverse events: i) Unsafe Acts, ii) 
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts, iii) Supervisory Factors, and iv) Organizational 
Influences. If at any time leading up to the adverse event, one of corrective action at 
any stage is not prevented, the accident can occur. When analysing the cause of the 
accident caused by human factors, although the active failure is directly attributable 
to the front-line operator, specifically analysing the causes reveals that there are latent 
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conditions that increase the likelihood of active failure. Such preconditions of 
inappropriate behaviour, inadequate culture, and organizational influences can 
aggravate the effects of the unsafe acts upon the system’s safety, restraints, and 
barriers (Reason, 2016). Therefore, it can be said that accidents are caused by human 
factors and system failures surrounding them, rather than technical defects.  
 
Figure 3-6. Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model (1990b) 
 
 
 
 
However, this model was not sufficient to identify and classify the actual and latent 
causes in a systematic method. In order to satisfy this need, the HFACS framework 
was generated. 
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3.2. Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) 
 
The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) (Shappell and 
Wiegmann, 2001) was originally developed and tested by the United States Navy to 
identify and classify the human errors of aviation accidents. The HFACS framework 
uses the same four levels of human failure presented by Reason’s model and 
advanced the causal sub-categories to identify the actual and underlying factors that 
occur accident. The HFACS framework assists accident investigators to 
systematically identify the active and latent failures within the organization that lead 
to an accident. 
 
Figure 3-7. The HFACS framework (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2012) 
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Currently, the HFACS framework is one of the most common frameworks which 
adopted Reason’s theory on accident causation with active and latent failures. 
Originally, since HFACS was designed to apply to the aviation accident, it could be 
slightly revised to optimize for their industry field and utilised to analysis latent failures 
or organisational defect in the existing accidents; air traffic control (HFACS-ATC: 
Page, Wiegmann and Shappell, 2001; Scarborough, Bailey and Pounds, 2005), 
aircraft maintenance extension (HFACS-ME: Krulak, 2004), offshore helicopter 
transport industry (HFACS-HE: Omole and Walker, 2015), rail road (HFACS-RR: 
Reinach and Viale, 2006; Baysari, McIntosh and Wilson, 2008; Madigan, Golightly 
and Madders, 2016), health care (Diller, Dunning, Buchanan and Shappell, 2014; 
Hoffman, Segal, Foster and Rhoads, 2013), mining industry (HFACS-MI: Patterson 
and Shappell, 2010; Lenné, Salmon, Liu and Trotter, 2012). 
 
The result of previous researches in the different industry fields appears that HFACS 
is a reliable retrospective tool to analysis the extensive accident investigation reports, 
identifying where and which errors and adverse events are underlying organizational 
system. 
 
In the maritime field, there have been a lot of studies using HFACS framework. Celik 
and Cebi (2009) generated HFACS model, based on a Fuzzy Analytical Hierarchy 
Process (FAHP), to add the quantitative assessment of shipping accidents, and to 
order of priority the contributing factors to the accidents. The results present the need 
to recreate the safety guideline in the various industry field.  
 
Furthermore, a dedicated Human and Organisational Factors (HOFs) framework for 
maritime accidents investigation and analysis was developed and named as HFACS-
MA framework (Chen and Chou, 2012; Chen, Wall, Davies, Yang, Wang and Chou, 
2013). This framework includes structures which in conformity with the main concept 
of HFACS, Reason 's Swiss Cheese Model, and Hawkins’ SHEL Model, combining 
with Why-Because Graph (WBG). This integrated model not only demonstrates the 
causation between factors but also presents the adverse affection between each level.   
Overall, using the HFACS tool, an organization identifies the hidden failure 
underneath the managerial control system that is likely to happen accident, and 
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investigators could detect the reoccurring trend of human error and organizational 
deficiencies through the existing accident.  
 
The HFACS also can be utilised as the framework that reviews and analyses the 
massive historical accidents and safety data. In addition, by breaking down the 
contributing factors on investigation records, analysists could distinguish unsafe acts 
and those related root causes so that the discovered factors could be helpful to 
improve the safety quality of the organizational system.       
 
 
3.3. Maritime HFACS Taxonomy 
 
This study applied the newly developed Maritime HFACS framework by Kim, Na and 
Ha (2011) for the purpose of analysing human factor related to the marine accident. 
The Maritime HFACS framework is currently used by the investigators of Korea 
Maritime Safety Tribunal (KMST), the marine accident investigation institute, when 
they identify human errors in categories of this framework on the phase of grasp and 
analysis of human error in the investigation of marine accident.   
 
As described earlier, HFACS model of the aviation industry is divided into four stages: 
Unsafe Acts, Preconditions for Unsafe Acts, Supervisory Factors, and Organizational 
Influences. Combining the HFACS framework with six “Human elements” presented 
on the IMO Casualty Investigation Code (Res.A.884(21)) and the “GEMS” framework, 
the new model of Maritime HFACS was developed as Figure 3-8.  
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Figure 3-8. Detail Components of Maritime HFACS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IMO defined the latent factors affecting to human behaviour and working process as 
six elements of People factors, Ship factors, Working and living conditions, 
Organization on board, Shore-side management, and External influences and 
environment. Conjoining these six factors with organisational influences, supervisory 
factors, and precondition for unsafe acts of HFACS framework, the new category of 
Organisational latent factor and Onboard latent factor was constructed.  
 
In addition, Unsafe acts category was compounded of Unintentional action and 
Intentional action of GEMS framework. In line with the result, a new Maritime HFACS 
framework classified into three levels of Organisational influences, Precondition for 
unsafe acts, and Unsafe acts was established as shown in Figure 3-9 (KMST, 2013).  
 
 
IMO Casualty  
Investigation Code  
GEMS Framework  
(Reason, 1990) 
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Figure 3-9. Maritime HFACS taxonomy 
 
 
 
First Level: Organisational Influences 
 
The first level of the Maritime HFACS framework is the phase of Organisational 
influences by the shipowner/manager. Organisational failures are often hidden, so 
they do not reveal easily during the accident investigation unless the organisational 
scheme is understood clearly and the constant accident analysis framework is applied 
to the organisation. Unfortunately, identification of the errors at this highest level could 
be hindered because a company is reluctant to hold a liability for the failures with a 
fear of blame. These organisational influences generally include Inappropriate 
management/supervision, Inappropriate operation, and Violation.  
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Inappropriate Management/supervision  
Allocation and maintenance of organisational resources are the most obvious 
decision-making of the shipowner/manager. Organisational resources encompass 
human resources, technological resources, and equipment/facility resources. 
Inadequate crew management/supervision, absence of training and mismanagement 
of equipment could create an unsafe situation.  
 
Inappropriate operation 
This category refers to cooperate decision-making that governs formal process of the 
organisation, including operations and procedures. The operation tempo, 
inappropriate operating system, improper operation plan, and absence of safety 
culture belong to this category. In addition, the case of the poor working condition 
such as improper punishment system, employment policy, etc. fall under the failure of 
inappropriate operation.    
 
 Violations 
The acts that shipowner/manager deliberately violates the regulation or rule, e.g. of 
the unqualified crew onboard, violation of the safety manning, or acceptance of 
violation of the crew. 
 
 
Second Level: Preconditions for unsafe acts   
 
The active failures of unsafe acts are so obvious that it is likely to conclude them as 
the basic cause of the accident. However, accident investigators need to look deeper 
into precondition of the unsafe act that caused the active failures to know why the 
unsafe acts happened. The framework includes the second level of analysing the 
preconditions for unsafe acts, which involves the Outside factors, Personnel factors, 
and Onboard factors.  
 
Outside factors 
Outside factors consist of Environmental physical factors and Governance 
rule/regulations. Physical phenomena refer operational environment such as weather, 
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port facilities, current, pilot, etc. Governance rule/regulations are intended to 
determine the compliance with safety regulation. This factor was added to the existing 
HFACS framework, because one criticism of HFACS has been failed to consider the 
external influences outside organizational level, such as government, regulators, 
manufacturer, social, environmental, political, economic and customers influence, etc. 
(Omole and Walker, 2015).  
 
Accordingly, a lot of previous research applied the category of Rule/regulation to the 
fifth level of HFACS framework; HFACS-HE (Omole and Walker, 2015), HFACS-MA 
(Chen and Chou, 2012), HFACS-RR (Reinach and Viale, 2006), HFACS-MSS 
(Schröder, Baldauf, and Ghirxi, 2011). This factor will ensure that the regulator’s 
regime does not adversely affect a ship safety. The regulations should follow the 
technical changes that contribute to the ship safety, and the process of establishing 
safety standards should detect potential risk that leads to a loophole in the regulations. 
 
Personnel factors 
If the crew resource management or self-imposed stressors create the precondition 
for unsafe behavior, these factors can be referred as Cognitive factors, Physical 
factors and Personal readiness. Conditions of seafarers are closely related to their 
behaviors. Cognitive factors include the individual’s boredom, inattention, 
overconfidence, or a perceived absence of threat, and physiological state deals with 
the normal functioning of body. It is important to determine their physical condition to 
assure that not to increase the safety risk due to medical or physiological conditions. 
Personal readiness refers to a state in which the crew has a sufficient knowledge 
about navigation and machinery so that there are no obstacles or disabilities in the 
operation of the ship, and that the crew is properly trained and educated. 
 
Onboard factors 
The factors related to the ship largely divided into Organisation onboard, 
Technological factors, and Workplace factors. Organisational factors onboard cover 
organisational climate and crew interaction. An organisational climate refers to the 
variables working atmosphere within the organisation, including the structure, policies, 
and culture affects individual behavior. Inadequate chain-of-command structure, 
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adversarial policies and inappropriate rules, attitudes and customs of the ship could 
contribute the manner in which the crew’s task is carried out negatively. Good crew 
interaction can reduce the ineffective communication skill or a lack of teamwork. Poor 
team coordination leads to confusion in individuals’ responsibilities, then results in the 
organisational breakdown. Technological factors encompass the design of ship or 
equipment, handling of cargoes, maintenance check-up status, ship’s draft, etc. 
Workplace factors include the condition of work place such as lighting, noise, miasma, 
working tool, etc. 
 
 
Third Level: Unsafe Acts 
 
Unsafe acts that directly lead to marine accidents are divided into Intentional and 
Unintentional actions as follows; Slip, Lapse, Mistake, and Violation. Crew’s 
behaviour is also divided into knowledge-based, rule-based and skill-based 
behaviours through learning and experience. 
 
Unintentional acts include a Slip and Lapse caused by a skill-based error. A Slip refers 
to a situation where the understanding of the situation and the choice of behaviour 
are correct, but the action itself is misplaced due to momentary attention failure. A 
lapse refers to a behavioural failure due to a momentary memory problem. Intentional 
acts contain a mistake and violation. A mistake includes knowledge-based errors that 
indicate the uncomprehending acts or inaccurate behaviour by prejudice and rule-
based errors due to excessive confidence. A violation represents a case of intentional 
disregard of a regulation, rule or procedure. 
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4. Methodology 
 
4.1. Adoption of Maritime HFACS 
 
The first step to analysis marine casualty investigation was to find a reasonable 
analysis tool for distinguishing the active and latent factor of human error. Qualitative 
methods can be more useful for identifying the human error and determining the 
cause of the accident. One of the most well-known tools for assessing the human 
causal factor is the HFACS framework. Many researchers have utilised the HFACS 
tool to measure the actual and latent conditions involved in the accidents. Given the 
previous success that HFACS, which developed in the aviation field, has been 
modified and optimised in a variety of industries, it seems reasonable to apply the 
HFACS framework to identify active and latent failures within the maritime accidents 
in hopes that similar results could achieve. The amended HFACS framework for the 
marine accident is called Marine HFACS.  
As above mentioned, KMST adopted the Maritime HFACS framework as the analysis 
method of human elements to the Guidelines for Maritime Accident Investigation 
(2013) for their worksite operation of the marine accident investigation. According to 
the guidelines, when it is unclear whether the identified potential factors are affected, 
additional and repeated investigations are conducted to pinpoint potential factors that 
cause the unsafe acts.  
Consequently, this study, which re-analyses the accident investigation reports that 
have identified human error in accordance with the Maritime HFACS framework, was 
estimated as a meaningful research to show that whether the latent factors contained 
in the accident report are sufficient to reveal the root cause of the accident, and the 
identified human error represents the trends in overall passenger ship accident. 
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For the demonstration of the application of the Marine HFACS category, the case of 
“Precondition for unsafe acts” (1st tier), “Onboard factors” (2nd tier), and “Technological 
factors” (3rd tier) can be given in terms of “Unsuitable equipment”. the “Technical 
factors” is one of three resources of 3rd tier category included in “Onboard factors” of 
the 2nd tier. The “Unsuitable equipment” such as spare parts not fitted to the specific 
machinery on board can cause an equipment and machinery malfunction. From the 
organisational point of view, it is required to look into how and why the unsuitable 
component is allocated, and whether the seafarers already knew that and reported to 
the upper level of organisation.   
 
4.2. Database 
Data was collected from marine accident reports released on the website of KMST. 
Accident investigation reports for the aim of this study were selected based on the 
following conditions; All cases of accidents are subjected to the completion of 
judgment for cause investigation and responsibility for it. The accident period is 
restricted to accidents that occurred from January 1, 2014 to December 31, 2015. The 
ship type is limited to the passenger ship, including high-speed craft, super speed 
craft, super high-speed craft, enclosed Ro-Pax, and opened Ro-Pax. A navigation 
area is bound to Korean coastal sea. Passenger ships less than 100 gross tonnages 
were removed from this object. The type of accident is selected by all kind of accident 
causing death, injuries, damages on human and ship, and the accident which had a 
potential to lead to these adverse events.  
 
4.3. Data coding and analysis 
Investigation reports were coded by the author with advice by two Human Factors 
experts. Before beginning the HFACS coding, details about each accident were 
extracted with ship name, ship age, ship type, gross tonnage, accident date, accident 
type, accident location, and the result of accident. 
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After that, the author looked through the investigation reports exhaustively, and the 
contributory factors stated on the reports discern and distributed on the specific 
category of Maritime HFACS framework. For this, the Maritime HFACS diagram 
(Figure 3.9) and the classified code table for latent factors of Level 1 and 2 specified 
in the Guideline for Maritime Accident Investigation (2013) (refer to Appendix B) were 
used, with reference to the description and table of HFACS taxonomy provided in 
Shappell and Wiegmann (2012). The total 96 human error causal factors were found 
out in the 30 investigation reports. This paper allowed the repetition of code to find as 
many human error causal factors as possible. 
After all of the data was coded, the analysis stage commenced. First, the 96 
contributing factors were classified under three levels of Maritime HFACS: 
organisational influences, precondition for unsafe acts, and unsafe acts. For the next 
step, the factors in each category were subdivided into sub-categories depending on 
their attribute. This stage allowed to confirm the contributory factors under each level 
of Maritime HFACS framework by the different types of accidents: Machinery failure, 
Grounding, Flooding, Contact, and Collision.  
However, regarding the organisational influences of level 1, the author found that it is 
not possible to assign the contributory factor related to the organisational procedure 
such as procedural guidance or informational resources due to the lack of the code. 
Although, the code of inappropriate procedure, regulations, instructions is included in 
the organisation category of onboard factor, this is also considered to be a potential 
safety issue for the organisation. In the present study, the factor of organisational 
procedure was included in the category of operation at the level 1.    
On completion of classification, the process of the relational analysis of contributing 
factors between each level was carried out by accident type. Chased the deployment 
process of each single accident, related causal factors between the level were linked 
to each other. This final step explored the specific pattern of the accidents and the 
contributing factors that need further inquest.  
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5. Results and discussion 
 
5.1. Accident database  
 
A total of 30 accident cases that occurred in the two years span between 2014 and 
2015 were used in the analysis, involving five main types of accidents as follows 
(KMST, 2016).  
 Machinery damage/failure (N= 16) 
 Collision (with other vessels) (N= 5) 
 Grounding (N= 4) 
 Contact (to bridge or pier) (N= 3) 
 Flooding (N= 2) 
The highest frequency of machinery damage/failure shows the similarity with the 
passenger ship accident statistics over the past five years (Table 2-5), which recorded 
the largest portion of 30.4% concerning machinery damage/failure.   
The average year of 30 accident vessels was 15.3 by the time of the accident, 
occurring mostly in 16 years and more, with 66.7%. The frequency of vessels by ship 
year as follows.  
 01 – 05year (N= 5) 
 16 - 10year (N= 3) 
 11 – 15year (N= 2) 
 16 – 20year (N= 13) 
 Over 20year (N= 7)  
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With respect to the accident location, the 11 cases of accidents in ports or 
approaching channels occurred, accounting for 36.7%. This ratio is much higher than 
the result of statistics in the past five years, which accounted for 12.9% (Figure 2-9). 
Of the 11 accidents, six were accidents caused by machinery damage. This fact 
suggests that passenger ship with frequent inbound and outbound ports should pay 
particular attention to the use of the machinery.    
 
Regarding the effect of the accidents, most accidents only suffered minor damage to 
the hull and equipment, except one person of drowning in a collision accident. In 
addition, the total 19 injuries occurred in contact and collision accidents. In the one 
case of the flooding accident, the discharge valve of the lubricating oil tank was 
opened due to flooded engine room, and 195 litres of lubricating oil and 5 litres of 
bilge water were discharged into the sea, resulting in marine pollution. The details 
about accident vessel list can be shown in Appendix A. 
 
As mentioned earlier, Maritime HFACS is a contributory factor analysis framework 
that investigators of KMST use to refer to investigation reports presently, so there was 
no major difficulty in dividing the factors presented in the report back into the 
framework. The investigators examined contributing factors, focusing on unsafe 
actions and thoughts of the crew that had an impact on the immediate cause of the 
accident, and potential condition that affects to the active failures. 
 
Accordingly, this coding work carried out only with the contents described in the 
accident investigation reports. As a result of the examination, the distribution of 
HFACS category in the 30 investigation reports is described in Table 5-1. A total of 
96 contributing factors were identified, averaging 3.2 factors per investigation report. 
Grounding and flooding accident report were the highest, with an average of 4.5 
factors, and machinery failure accident report were the lowest, with an average 2.4 
factors.  
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Table 5-1. Distribution of number of causal factors by accident type 
Type of Accident 
Frequency 
of Accident 
Number of 
Causal 
Factors 
Number of causal factors per 
accident cases 
Min Max Mean 
Machinery failure 16 39 1 4 2.4 
Grounding 4 18 4 5 4.5 
Flooding 2 9 4 5 4.5 
Contact 3 12 2 6 4.0 
Collision 5 18 2 6 3.6 
Total 30 96  
 
 
5.2. Causal factor coding 
 
After all the contributory factors have been identified, the first step for coding was 
executed. These factors were classified by three levels of Maritime HFACS: 
organisational Influences, preconditions for unsafe acts, and unsafe acts.  
 
Table 5-2 shows that the frequency of causal factors of 30 accident investigation 
reports and the percentage, which is the ratio frequency occurrence to the total 96 
contributory factors. The category of the highest proportion of HFACS category is the 
unsafe acts (42.7%), followed by preconditions for unsafe acts (39.6%) and 
organisational influences (17.7%). Then, the contributory factors allocated in each 
HFACS category further classified into 15 subcategories. 
 
At the level 1 of organisational influences category, the factors related to the 
company’s management/supervision were higher than operation, with 12.5% and 
5.2%, respectively. However, violation of the organisation was not mentioned in the 
accident report. Among the level 2 of pre-conditions for unsafe acts, onboard 
organisation factors show a highest ratio in the accident reports, accounting for 9.6%. 
personnel readiness in personnel factors and physical environment in outside factors 
were the highest as 8.3% and 7.3%, respectively. However, none of the reports 
referred to the causal factors involved in physiological state of seafarers. In the level 
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3 of unsafe acts category, the proportion of violations was the most frequent category, 
accounting for 25%, followed by mistakes as 15.6%.  
 
Table 5-2. Distribution of casual factors of HFACS category 
 Category Sub-category Frequency  Percentage 
Level 
1 
Organisational Influences (17.7%) 
 Management/Supervision  
Operation 
Violations 
12 
5 
- 
12.5% 
5.2% 
- 
Level 
2 
Pre-conditions for unsafe acts (39.6%) 
Outside factors  Physical Environment 
Rule/ Regulations 
7 
1 
7.3% 
1.0% 
Personnel factors  Cognitive factors 
Physiological factors 
Personnel readiness 
5 
- 
8 
5.2% 
- 
8.3% 
Onboard factors Organisation 
Technological factors 
Workplace factors 
10 
6 
1 
9.6% 
6.3% 
1.0% 
Level 
3 
Unsafe acts (42.7%) 
Unintentional Slip 
Lapse 
1 
1 
1.0% 
1.0% 
Intentional Mistake 
Violation 
15 
24 
15.6% 
25.0% 
Total 96 100.0% 
 
 
5.3. HFACS category analysis 
 
Figure 5-1 describes the percentage of casual factors by accident type. In all types of 
accident reports, it can be seen that each level’s contributing factors have been found. 
The machinery failure accident as unsafe act of HFACS category was classified more 
often than other categories, accounting for 16.7%, whilst the organisation Influences 
factors of collision and grounding accident were the lowest proportion with 1.0%. In 
the grounding accident report, the proportion of precondition for unsafe acts factors 
was significantly higher than level 1 and level 3, accounting for 11.5%. As for the 
collision accident, the frequency of unsafe acts was significantly higher than other 
levels, with 12.5%.  
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Figure 5-1. Percentage of casual factors by accident type  
 
 
 
Further analysis to examine the interrelation between the HFACS subcategory and 
accident types were conducted. The frequency and proportion of causal factors by 
accident type is demonstrated on Table 5-3 below.  
 
In case of the machinery failure, the violation in the level 3 of unsafe acts was the 
highest (35.9%), followed by the organisational management/supervision (20.5%). 
Among the preconditions for unsafe acts, 12.8% were the onboard organisational 
factors.  
 
In the grounding accident, mistakes of seafarers were the largest portion with 33.3% 
and personnel readiness with 22.2% and physical environment with 16.7% appeared 
at a high frequency.  
 
In two cases of the flooding, one lapse and one mistake for the unsafe acts were 
identified. And, as the precondition for unsafe acts, onboard factors were most 
frequently founded, accounting for 44.4%. At the Level 1 of organisational influences, 
two factors of management/supervision and one factor of operation were discovered.  
 
 
 
 
0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0%
Machinery
Grounding
Flooding
Contact
Collision
Lv.1 Organisation Lv. 2 Precondition Lv. 3 Unsafe acts
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Table 5-3. Distribution of causal factors of HFACS subcategory by accident type 
 
 
The contact accident report reveals three factors of mistakes and two factors of 
violation of seafarers, which are most occupied with 41.7%. The elements related to 
Level 1 and Level 2 were found to be very diverse; manage/supervision, operation of 
organisational influences and physical environment, cognitive factor, personnel 
readiness, onboard organisation and technological factor of precondition.  
 
With regard to the collision accident, the most common violation of unsafe acts was 
found (44.4%), and the next high frequency was the mistakes with 22.2%. The 
precondition that most affected the accident revealed the physical environment, 
accounting for 16.7%.    
Category Subcategory 
Mach- 
#(%) 
Ground- 
#(%) 
Flood- 
#(%) 
Contact 
#(%) 
Collision 
#(%) 
Total 
#(%) 
Lv 
1 
Management/ Supervision 
8 
(20.5) 
- 
2 
(22.2) 
1 
(8.3) 
1 
(5.6) 
12 
(12.5) 
Operation 
2 
(5.1) 
1 
(5.6) 
1 
(11.1) 
1 
(8.3) 
- 
5 
(5.2) 
Violations - - - - - - 
Lv 
2 
Outside 
factors 
Physical 
Environment 
- 
3 
(16.7) 
- 
1 
(8.3) 
3 
(16.7) 
7 
(7.3) 
Rule/ Regulations - 
1 
(5.6) 
- - - 
1 
(1.0) 
Personnel 
factors 
Cognitive factors 
2 
(5.1) 
1 
(5.6) 
- 
1 
(8.3) 
1 
(5.6) 
5 
(5.2) 
Physiological 
factors 
- - - - - - 
Personnel 
readiness 
2 
(5.1) 
4 
(22.2) 
- 
1 
(8.3) 
1 
(5.6) 
8 
(8.3) 
Onboard 
factors 
Onboard 
organisation 
5 
(12.8) 
2 
(11.1) 
2 
(22.2) 
1 
(8.3) 
- 
10 
(9.6) 
Technological 
factors 
4 
(10.2) 
- 
1 
(11.1) 
1 
(8.3) 
- 
6 
(6.3) 
Workplace factors - - 
1 
(11.1) 
- - 
1 
(1.0) 
Lv 
3 
Un-
intentional 
acts 
Slip 
1 
(2.6) 
- - - - 
1 
(1.0) 
Lapse - - 
1 
(11.1) 
- - 
1 
(1.0) 
Intentional 
acts 
Mistake 
1 
(2.6) 
6 
(33.3) 
1 
(11.1) 
3 
(25.0) 
4 
(22.2) 
15 
(15.6) 
Violation 
14 
(35.9) 
- - 
2 
(16.7) 
8 
(44.4) 
24 
(25.0) 
Total 
39 
(100) 
18 
(100) 
9 
(100) 
12 
(100) 
18 
(100) 
96 
(100) 
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5.4. Factor relationship analysis by accident type 
 
Based on the contributing factors identified in the subcategory by level, the author 
probed into the detailed conditions of single accident case and integrated into each 
level by accident type. In addition, the author inspected the relationship of contributing 
factors at each level to those at different levels to determine whether the latent failures 
of level 1 and 2 have been sufficiently discovered by investigators. For this purpose, 
the author found correlations by finding level 2 factors that could originate from level 
1 or that level 1 affected, and then, determined the factors of unsafe acts that could 
be caused by the factor of level 2 and connected them to each other. For example, 
the absence of educational-training by the shipowner/manager triggered the lack of 
knowledge of seafarers as a latent error and unsafe acts that may occur due to lack 
of knowledge of level 2 is the operational inability of equipment.  
 
Machinery Failure 
 
16 accident reports of machinery failure have found out 39 contributory factors. Figure 
5-2 exhibits a diagram of the relationships in which the contributing factors identified 
at each level are affecting contributing factors at different levels, in terms of machinery 
failure accident. In 14 of the 16 accident cases, the accident reports indicated that the 
active failure of the machinery defect was due to maintenance negligence of 
machinery by Chief Engineer (C/E) or Captain. In order to provide a more specific 
overview about the machinery failure resulted from improper maintenance, some 
technical casual factors involved in malfunctioning of a machinery are shown in Table 
5-4. 
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▌ Figure 5-2. Relations of Casual Factors between Levels (Machinery Failure)  
 
*Note: 1. The number means the frequency of contributory factors. 
2. Dotted line describes the relationships that did not directly affect the lower-level factors, but 
which, in combination with those factors, had an impact on the accident.  
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Table 5-4. Reported technical causes of machinery failure 
 Main Engine 
- Piston Pin Bush to break loose 
- Breather valve breakdown caused Fresh water tank exploded 
- Turbo charger inhalation fixing spring to break loose 
- Stud fatigue scission   
- Impurities in cooling water system 
- Cylinder Fuel injection nozzle cap overtightening cause sealing damaged 
- Cylinder inhalation valve sheet faulty 
- Cylinder inhalation valve collet fatigue scission  
 Steering Gear 
- Relay Switch breakdown 
- Steering Shaft to break loose  
 Rudder 
- Leakage of Gland packing 
- Piston Pin Bush to break loose 
 Miscellaneous 
- Impurities in Fuel oil filter cause Relief valve damaged 
- Spare Seawater pump fatigue scission 
 
 
As illustrated in Figure 5-2, a variety of factors on the level 2 contributed to the latent 
cause of the maintenance negligence. Regarding the personnel factors, the different 
two cases showing the inability to judge the situation despite the perception of risk 
indicator and the failure to prepare a maintenance record imply that the C/E has an 
undesirable attitude to their duty. In the first event, however, the onshore supervisor 
also did not take any action against the identified risk on the main engine despite 
every week inspection, and in the second event, the shipowner operated the vessel 
without confirming the specific maintenance details since the purchase of the vessel. 
These inadequate systematic supervision and inspection were found to affect the 
unfavourable attitude of the seafarers.  
 
The time constraints indicated as the other cause of the maintenance negligence are 
the potential factors that threaten the safety of passenger ship with frequent inbound 
and outbound port. Although, the investigation report no longer discussed this issue 
in detail, this problem should inquire the reason through multifarious approaches and 
eliminate the latent conditions by managerial control such as the redistribution of 
workload, new recruits, or a support from onshore.     
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The preterition of the takeover procedure and unavailable informational resources 
suggest that there is a problem within the operational system of the company as well 
as the direct responsibility of seafarers. These inappropriate management of 
company has a negative impact on the safety working onboard.  
In addition, the inattentive maintenance of crew members can be eliminated in 
advance by thorough supervision of the company. Five investigation reports out of 16 
referred the inadequate supervision of manager as the latent failure of Level 1. The 
role of the manager as a supervisor is to periodically check the company's overall 
operations, decisions, policies, and safety status of the ship to remove the hazards 
onboard previously. 
The insufficient information of equipment also brought about the machinery defect. 
The lack of safety education onboard made seafarers’ careless action and the 
absence of technical knowledge caused the unskilled handling by seafarer. It is 
important to note that thorough training and skilful handling of equipment are essential 
for the seafarer onboard ship.   
The responsibility for the actual management of the hull, machinery and equipment is 
on the captain and the C/E, but the ship owner is also obliged to maintain good 
condition of the ship so that the hull, machinery and equipment operate normally. To 
provide suitable human and equipment resources onboard, to establish appropriate 
performance standards, and to dispatch the qualified supervisors could be the barriers 
to avoid the machinery failure. 
 
Grounding 
 
Four investigation reports of the grounding identified 18 causal factors. Figure 5-3 
demonstrates the casual factors of each level and those relationships with regard to 
grounding accident. In which, most of the factors related to the unsafe acts of the 
seafarers and latent factors related to the ship were identified.  
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Active failure of grounding accident significantly revealed the failure of fixing on ship’s 
position and improper manoeuvre. As the latent cause for the unknown ship’s position, 
the improper use of navigational aids (e.g. GPS plotter, radar, etc.) and the 
discomposure of seafarers with heavy rain contributed to the unsafe acts.  Regarding 
the latent factors that caused inappropriate manoeuvre, the combination of 
environmental factor (current) and operational factors (lack of watchkeeping) on board 
▌ Figure 5-3. Relations of Casual Factors between Levels (Grounding)  
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led the ship to the shallow water area. The lack of navigational information affects to 
the selection of safe course, resulting in the wrong decision. However, as the causal 
factors of inappropriate use of navigational aids and the lack of watchkeeper is 
insufficient on the investigation reports, it is needed to provide further investigation of 
organisational management or supervision. 
Furthermore, the compelling ship manager to operate vessels without adequate port 
information was a threat to the preparation of seafarers for safe navigation, which in 
turn affects the unsafe acts of seafarers. In this case, the fact that the port authority, 
who had a dredging construction in the port, has not properly reviewed the dredging 
work in the process of approval of ship’s course and trial running was the one of the 
contributory factors. 
A possible explanation for the main contributory factors to the grounding accident may 
be the lack of adequate navigation skill, planning, and heavy weather. For the 
organisational approach, it is required further investigation for use of the navigation 
equipment, the placement of watchkeeper, and operational procedure for the irregular 
circumstance. 
 
Flooding 
 
Two flooding accident reports revealed nine contributory factors. The results of the 
interrelation analysis of contributory factors involved in Flooding accident are shown 
in Figure 5-4. These flooding accidents were caused by seawater inflow through hole 
on the hull. The first accident was resulted from the stagnant bilge and painting 
missing on the engine room bottom. This could be caused by the negligence of the 
management of the C/E, but it was also discovered as a potential cause of the 
insufficient maintenance and inappropriate supervision of manager.  
 
The second accident caused by the fact that the C/E did not close the inspection hole 
while simultaneously handling the important work. However, the factor that the 
shipowner did not set up a procedure for major work was a latent failure, which the 
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C/E handled the two tasks alone at the same time. Hence, in order to assure the ship’s 
safety, proper management and supervision of the ship is required.  
 
 
Contact 
 
Contact with pier or bridge accident occurred three events and 12 contributing factors 
were identified. Figure 5-5 below illustrates the relations of casual factors between 
levels of Contact accident. The active failure of contact is divided into the out of control 
due to mechanical failure (two cases) and improper manoeuvre due to contrary 
weather (one case). The defects that caused the engine failure were already 
recognized by the crew and the manager. To ignore the warning alarm with a 
▌ Figure 5-4. Relations of Casual Factors between Levels (Flooding)  
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complacency, or not to set an emergency plan in spite of recognizing the state of an 
unstable machine, was enough to bring about an accident. 
 
At the organisational level, continuing to operate without sufficient action on the flaw 
is a potential cause of the accident. The insufficient safety standards of the 
shipowners make it difficult for the crew to judge the situation properly, which leads 
directly to improper operation. As for the overspeed of unsafe acts, it is needed to 
identify whether this problem is involved in the individual habit or is influenced by the 
operational tempo.  
Looking at the pathway of contact accident, unsolved machinery damage, which 
combined with overspeed of engine or complacency resulted in the machinery failure, 
Figure 5-5. Relations of Casual Factors between Levels (Contact)  
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and insufficient safety standards for the heavy weather affected to decision error of 
inappropriate manoeuvre.   
 
Collision 
 
Five collision accident reports described 18 causal factors. Figure 5-6 provides the 
intercorrelations of casual factors between levels of Collision accident. All five 
Collisions were caused by violations of navigational laws. The violation of Fog 
navigational regulations (fog signal, look-out, etc.), overspeed, and the non-fulfilment 
of collision-avoidance action were the active failure of the collision accident.  
These violations of regulation determined a latent failure of the lack of navigation 
knowledge of seafarers, which results from the insufficient education-training by 
shipowner/manager. In the non-fulfilment of collision-avoidance action, the 
complacency of seafarers affected to the unsafe acts. 
Although collision accidents are highly influenced by the limited visibility, the 
navigational law observance and safety awareness development through education 
and training can reduce the risk of accident.   
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5.5. Discussion 
 
An initial objective of this dissertation was to identify the active and latent failures of 
the existing investigation reports, the accident mechanism by accident type, and the 
quality of investigation reports. 
The analysis of 30 investigation reports using HFACS tool has enabled to discovery 
of 96 human error causal factors involved in passenger ship accident. The relational 
analysis between active and latent failures has facilitated to understand of accident 
pattern from the latent factors of the organisational system through the latent factors 
of onboard to the unsafe acts of seafarers. Additionally, the relational analysis has 
suggested the causal factors that need further development.  
 
▌ Figure 5-6. Relations of Casual Factors between Levels ( Collision)  
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5.5.1. HFACS Utility 
 
The HFACS framework helps to distinguish active failures and latent failures involving 
in the existing accident reports. In this study, the category with the most common 
contributory factor in the level of unsafe acts is the violations by seafarers. Compared 
with an another HFACS analysis of tugboat collision accident in Korea (Kim et al., 
2011), unsafe acts mainly related to mistake (48.4%) and violation (42.4%), which 
also are the highest portion among all categories. However, in the previous research 
in both maritime (Chauvin, Lardjane, Morel, Clostermann, and Langard, 2013; 
Schröder et al., 2011) and other industries (Griggs, 2012; Madigan, Golightly and 
Madders, 2016; Patterson et al., 2010), violation rarely accounts for the highest 
percentage of all categories, as well as at the level of unsafe acts. 
At the precondition for unsafe acts, the condition of onboard organisation occupied 
the largest portion, followed by personnel readiness, physical environment, and 
technological factor. Li, Harris and Yu (2008) also identified crew resources 
management as the most common factor of precondition. However, the prevailing 
factor of precondition has been variously identified in the different research; self-
imposed stress (Griggs, 2012), adverse mental state (Madigan et al., 2016), 
technological environment (Reinach and Viale, 2006; Schröder et al., 2011), and 
physical conditions (Patterson et al., 2010).  
At the level of organisational influences, like the earlier studies, the analysis reveals 
a relatively less frequency of factors compared to other levels. However, the 
percentage of organisational influences found in the reports was 17.7%, which was 
relatively low compared to other research: Griggs (2012): 37%; Madigan et al. (2016): 
21.6%; Schröder et al. (2011): 23.1%. 
As mentioned earlier, one of key findings from the causal factor analysis was the lack 
of code for organisational procedure. Issues related to the inappropriate 
organisational procedure identified in the investigation reports are; the lack of duty 
transfer procedure, the machinery instructions written in foreign language, insufficient 
safety standards for heavy weather, and the lack of critical operation procedure (e.g., 
bunkering). Patterson et al., (2010) showed that procedures were most common 
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(77.2%) within organisational process category, and argued that the lack of standard 
procedures makes the crew select the accomplishing method, which is not always the 
safest way to complete. This study also described that the procedural errors of 
organisation affected a variety of factors of precondition e.g., improper duty handover, 
inappropriate procedure on board, and estimate of the situation inability. Moreover, 
the code of inappropriate procedure of onboard factor category can be considered to 
be the responsibility of Captain or C/E, not the safety manager or shipowner.  
Therefore, the addition of organisational procedure category to the Maritime HFACS 
framework would provide an additional opportunity to understand the impact of 
improper procedure at the organisational level on the ship safety.  
Overall, these analyses demonstrate that the types and frequency of contributory 
factors may vary by the research field, but the most obvious finding to emerge from 
the HFACS analysis is that there are latent failures in all actual failures. This focus 
attention to the importance of violations of seafarers and onboard organisational 
factors to the passenger ship safety and demonstrate where supplement 
(organisational procedure) is required. 
 
5.5.2. Pattern of accident cause 
 
The analysis of investigation reports facilitates to establish the typical pattern of 
accident cause, although the case by accident type is small and the contributory 
factors at upper levels are not sufficient to know their influences the lower levels. 
Based on the relationships of contributory factors at each level by accident type, in 
total nine patterns are identified with active failure and latent failure. With regard to 
the presence of pattern, the relative risk associated with these failures are accessed, 
and the countermeasures to mitigate the failure are given to the Table 5-5.  
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Table 5-5.  Pattern of passenger ship accident cause    
 
What stands out in the accident pattern is that there are various latent factors that 
affect the maintenance negligence, which is the most common active cause, and the 
implications and countermeasures against them are also different. This result argues 
that the high maintenance should be supported by the appropriate operating 
procedure, safety supervision, education-training and sufficient resource 
management for equipment at the organisational level.  
Accident 
Type 
Pattern 
# 
Active 
Failure 
Latent 
Failure 
Implications 
Counter- 
measures 
Machinery 
Failure 
#1 
Maintenance 
Negligence 
Operating 
procedure 
Lack of 
procedure/ 
guideline 
caused the 
unawareness 
of machinery 
condition 
Reassess 
present 
procedure/ 
checklist, and 
Provide 
training 
#2 
Unskilled 
handling 
Resource 
Management 
(Human) 
Unqualified 
seafarers 
Provide 
instructions for 
mechanical 
operation and 
training 
#3 
Maintenance 
Negligence 
Unsafe 
supervision 
Failure of risk 
assessment 
Assign 
qualified 
supervisor 
Grounding #4 
Inappropriate 
manoeuvre 
Operational 
tempo 
Lack of 
navigational 
information 
Provide 
education-
training 
Flooding 
#5 
Maintenance 
negligence 
Unsafe 
supervision 
Failure of risk 
assessment 
Assign 
qualified 
supervisor 
#6 Lapse 
Operating 
procedure 
Imperfection of 
duty 
Develop 
working 
procedure 
Contact 
#7 
Maintenance 
Negligence 
Resource 
Management 
(Equipment) 
Machinery 
deficiency  
Revaluate the 
present 
procedure 
#8 
Inappropriate 
manoeuvre  
Operating 
procedure 
Lack of 
procedure/ 
guideline 
caused 
decision error 
Establishment 
of operational 
procedure 
Collision #9 
Violation of 
navigation rule 
Resource 
Management 
(Human) 
Unqualified 
seafarers 
Provide 
education-
training  
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5.5.3. Quality of investigation reports 
 
One of the objective of this study is to examine whether the investigation reports 
reflect enough detail organisational causal factors underlying within the managerial 
control system. As expected, however, like in previous studies, the data contained in 
the investigation reports was a few in quantity to discover the root cause of the 
accident. The major shortcomings of HFACS framework for identifying the 
contributory factors are the need of the massive database of factors, since lots of 
previous studies demonstrate that systematic approaches depend on the quality of 
the data provided (Madigan et al., 2016).  
Marine accident has a difficulty to investigate causal factors unlike the accident within 
land, as it is difficult to gather and secure evidence, such as preserving the accident 
site, recreating the accident and securing witnesses. In addition, the cause of the 
accident is fundamentally complex and diverse. Thus, it is not a simple task to 
discover the latent cause of the accident, unless the investigator conducts an in-depth 
investigation of the organisation. 
However, according to the other research, since the KCG and KMST, who are 
responsible for the investigation and judgment of marine accidents in Korea, identify 
causes of accidents mainly for the purpose of identifying violation of the law and 
estimating the ratio of responsibility, it is considered that the accident investigators do 
not pay careful attention to establish the root cause of an accident to prevent further 
accident (SNAK, 2015). 
Nevertheless, it should not be overlooked that the potential of the organisation could 
be a fatal cause of accidents. As KMST already uses HFACS framework as an 
accident investigation tool, it is estimated that it is fully aware of the importance of 
human factors and latent conditions underlying organisational system. The fact that 
there is the contributory factor which is not included under the Maritime HFACS 
category (organisational procedure) suggests the possibility that more latent factors 
may be found. It is necessary to clarify what is the root cause of the accident through 
the multiple investigations including the education-training of the seafarers, the 
 ６４ 
  
working process, the organisational culture, and not only the fragmentary cause of 
the accident. 
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6. Conclusions  
 
6.1. Conclusions 
 
Although the internal and external research that human error as a cause of accident 
occupies over 80% of marine accident, the object or application of human error in 
Korea maritime field is not sufficient. While the maritime technology has progressed 
evidently in material aspects of navigational hardware equipment such as Automatic 
Identification System (AIS), Automatic Radar Plotting Aid (ARPA), Electronic Chart 
Display and Information System (ECDIS), and E-navigation system, a study for 
advancements of the seafarers’ software aspect is the slow lane, comparing with the 
technological development. Although the sinking accident of Sewol ferry on the 
Korean coast gave a tremendous shock to our society and made the necessity of 
studying human elements more urgently, much research is still needed in the field of 
human error causal factor on the safety of the passenger ship in Korea. 
Accordingly, the aim of the current study was to determine the contributory factors to 
the passenger ship accident, and discussed the safety issue related to the passenger 
ship and the depth of information in the investigation reports. For the purpose, this 
paper presented the review of 30 accident investigation reports in order to examine 
the human error causal factors contributing to the passenger ship accident in Korean 
domestic water. The customized HFACS framework to the maritime accident was 
adopted and used to analyse the causal factors described in the accident reports. 
As a result, this study successfully demonstrates the validity of HFACS, that is, the 
analysis of human factors for the cause of marine accidents and the retrospective 
analysis of existing accidents. The adopted Maritime HFACS framework used in this 
study was able to identify 96 human error causal factors on three different level: 
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organisational influences, precondition of unsafe acts, and unsafe acts. The relational 
analysis of distributed factors between levels facilitated to understand the pattern of 
accident type.  
As a predominant result, the violation of crew, specifically those related to the 
maintenance negligence and violation of navigation law, was found that it had the 
greatest impact on the passenger ship accidents. As for the onboard latent failures, 
onboard organisation, personnel readiness, physical environment, technological 
factors, and cognitive factors affected the unsafe acts. At the organisational level, the 
factor of resource management and unsafe supervision exercised an influence on the 
lower level.    
The key findings in this study make available a new understanding of organisational 
procedure. The addition of the category of organisational procedure may provide 
further various aspect to the organisational influences. Also, this study confirmed that 
even though different accidents were caused by the same active failure, the latent 
condition affecting the active cause identified differently. Linked to this, the prevention 
plan against all potential failures should be prepared in advance to hinder even a 
single accident rather than a reduction in accident. 
Including this research, many of the existing studies discussed in this paper presents 
the lowest frequent findings of organisational failures, comparing with the level of 
active failures. This study did not reveal the specific reason for the lack of 
organisational factors, but it is considered that the acquisition of data is difficult due 
to the special environment of the ocean or the accident investigation focuses more on 
the estimation of liability for violation of laws than on the identification of causes of 
accidents.  
The contemporary marine safety issue requires discovering the latent failure to 
approach into the unobserved but fatal cause. Although identifying potential factors is 
necessary for the investigators to make tremendous efforts and sincerity, it is an 
essential process to eliminate the repetition of another accident risk. In order to ensure 
the marine safety, it is necessary to thoroughly and systematically carry out the 
investigation of all details of human factors from seafarers' navigation skill at every 
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accident. By using the data analysis from the higher quality of investigation reports, 
we are able to establish the effective strategy for the marine safety and reduce the 
repetitive mistakes.   
 
6.2 Limitations and future research 
 
This study has limitations and pragmatic performance as well. This paper shows the 
way to advanced study for the safety issues of marine accident, particularly to the 
passenger ship.   
This dissertation has the objective of factor analysis for the identification of active and 
latent cause of passenger ship accidents, but the study is limited by the lack of 
information on the organisational latent conditions in the investigation reports. The 
development of organisational elements, along with the addition of organisational 
procedure code, is a more challenging task for investigators.   
Secondly, this study is limited to passenger ship only, but by expanding the research 
area with various types of vessels, it would be possible to improve the overall quality 
of ship’s safety by finding measures to prevent human error that may be present in 
the entire domestic ship.  
A third limitation is the bias of the author. Even if the contribution factors are 
objectively analysed based on the contents of the report only and classified according 
to the category of HFACS, the results cannot help but reflect the opinions expressed 
by the author.  
Finally, only HFACS tool was used in this study to identify the predominant causal 
factors. Further analysis through comparison with other systemic analytical tools, e.g. 
Accimap (Rasmussen, 1997), FRAM (Hollnagel, 2012), is required for the practical 
objective.  
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Appendix A 
 
List of selected investigation reports into passenger ship accident 
No. Date Ship Name Age GT Category of Accident Accident location Damage for Ship Casualty
1 18-2-14 SHINANFERRY NO.2 4 400        Machinery damage/failure Haenam-gun, Hwawon-myeon Steering gear damage
2 21-5-14 DAEHUNG 3 424        Machinery damage/failure Sinangun, Palgeummyeon Steering gear damage
3 16-11-15 JOYANGFERRY NO.2 20 196        Machinery damage/failure Mokpo port Steering gear damage
4 24-3-15 GUMOHGOSOKFERRY 12 255        Machinery damage/failure Yeosu, Nammyeon No damage
5 23-5-14 PARADAIS 20 309        Machinery damage/failure Sinangun, Anjwamyeon Main Engine damage
6 11-8-15 PANSTARDREAM 18 9,759     Machinery damage/failure Busan port Main Engine damage
7 03-9-15 CSTAR 3 17 550        Machinery damage/failure Gangleung port Main Engine damage
8 20-5-15 CSTAR 1 6 388        Machinery damage/failure Sadong port Seawater Pump damage
9 26-2-15 SAMBO NO.12 7 393        Machinery damage/failure Eolyujeong port Water Tank Explosion
10 05-5-15 SUNFLOWER 20 2,394     Machinery damage/failure Ulleungdo Main Engine damage
11 11-12-14 SEODONGGOSOKFERRY NO.1 17 333        Machinery damage/failure Tongyeong, Yeonghwado Steering gear damage
12 01-3-15 JULIAAQUA 20 228        Machinery damage/failure Yeosu Fuel Oil Filter damage
13 15-6-14 SINHAE NO.9 17 154        Machinery damage/failure Yeonggwanggun, Gyema port Main Engine damage
14 10-5-14 KOREANA 17 226        Machinery damage/failure Incheon, Palmido Main Engine damage
15 04-5-14 SEAHOPE 23 299        Machinery damage/failure Ongjingun, Daechungmyeon Main Engine damage
16 02-5-14 DOLPHIN 18 310        Machinery damage/failure Ulleunggun, Dokdo Main Engine damage
17 15-12-15 SHINANFERRY NO.5 2 353        Grounding Shinangun, Jangsanmyeon Rudder/Propeller damage
18 23-9-15 GUMOHFERRY NO.3 22 137        Grounding Goheunggun, Jijukdo Bottom scratches
19 17-8-14 CHEONSA CARFERRY 10 279        Grounding Shinangun, Hyojido Propeller damage
20 23-6-15 HANILREDPEARL 20 2,862     Grounding Jeju, Shinyang port Bottom dent
21 30-5-15 NEW NAMHAEQUEEN 21 477        Flooding Mokpo port Lubricant, Bilge leakage
22 21-3-14 DDANGKKUT 14 225        Flooding Wando, Sanyangjin Pier Engine room Flooding
23 20-10-15 MOSULPO NO.2 1 156        Contact(eg. bridge, pier) Seogwipo, Mosul port Handrail damage
24 25-10-15 QUEENSTAR NO.2 2 364        Contact(eg. bridge, pier) Jeju Sangchujado Hull warp
25 10-12-14 NAMHAEGOSOKCARFERRY NO.7 23 3,780     Contact(eg. bridge, pier) Gohunggun, Nokdong New port Bow Ramp damage 11p injury
26 26-10-14 NAMHAEGOSOKCARFERRY NO.7 23 3,780     Collision(F/V SINGSING) Gohunggun, Sologhwado No damage 6p injury
27 19-8-14 HANRYUFERRY 21 178        Collision(F/V NO.808 TAEYANG) Yeosu, Dolsan 1st Bridge Hull dent
28 17-1-15 SEOKYUNG ISLAND 22 5,223     Collision(O/T MANSUNG) Busan port Hull scratches 1p drowning, 1p injury
29 19-7-14 RAINBOW 18 228        Collision(F/V GUKILHO) Incheon, Ongjingun Bow dent 8p wounds
30 28-3-14 DEMOCRACY NO.5 20 396        Collision(F/V ENSUK NO.5) Incheon, Ongjingun Pitting
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Appendix B 
 
Latent causal factor code of Maritime HFACS 
(Translated) 
 Latent Conditions Code Category 
O
U
T
S
ID
E
 F
A
C
T
O
R
 
Physical 
Environment 
a.1 Weather 
a.2 Vessel over-traffic 
a.3 VTS failures 
a.4 Obstacle 
a.5 Inappropriate navigation aid 
a.6 Poor navigation aid 
a.7 Inappropriate Notice to Mariner 
a.8 Mismanagement of waterway 
a.9 Inappropriate port facilities 
a.10 Shallow water 
a.11 Narrow waterway 
a.12 Strong current 
a.13 Frozen condition 
a.14 Drift ice area 
a.15 Pilot failures 
a.16 Etc. 
Ruel & Regulations 
b.1 Local special navigation regulations 
b.2 Int’l regulations & Codes 
b.3 Flag State regulations 
b.4 Port State regulations 
b.5 Others 
 
P
E
R
S
O
N
N
E
L
 F
A
C
T
O
R
 
Cognitive 
Factor 
c.1 Complacency 
c.2 Mental fatigue 
c.3 Nerves 
c.4 Haste, Flustration 
c.5 Distration 
c.6 Negative affectivity 
c.7 High-self confidence 
c.8 Low-self confidence 
c.9 Low work satisfaction 
c.10 Immoderate reliance on automated system 
c.11 Personality 
c.12 Mental disease 
c.13 Others 
Physiological 
Factor 
d.1 Physical fatigue 
d.2 Physical disease 
d.3 Alcohol, Drugs 
d.4 Sight or hearing disability 
d.5 Body condition 
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d.6 Motor ability 
d.7 Age, Sex 
d.8 Others 
Personnel  
Readiness 
e.1 Inadequate qualification (physical, aptitude, etc.) 
e.2 Lack of knowledge 
e.3 Misknowledge 
e.4 Lack of skills 
e.5 Estimate of the situation inability  
e.6 Erroneous assumption, prediction, prejudice 
e.7 Inappropriate habit 
e.8 Previous accident experience  
e.9 Others 
    
O
N
B
O
A
R
D
 F
A
C
T
O
R
 
Organisation 
f.1 Inappropriate custom regulation 
f.2 Organisational pressure (workload, workhour) 
f.3 Inaccurate responsibility & duty 
f.4 Aberrant communication 
f.5 Improper duty handover 
f.6 Inappropriate placement of human resources 
f.7 Chilling effect of seafarers 
f.8 Seafarers interaction 
f.9 Leadership problem (superior supervision) 
f.10 Immoderate authoritarianism 
f.11 Lack of authority 
f.12 Inappropriate procedure, regulations, instructions 
f.13 Education-training onboard 
f.14 Staffing of seafarers (nationality, qualification) 
f.15 Others 
Technological 
Factor 
g.1 Ship design 
g.2 Equipment & tool (utility, reliability) 
g.3 Maintenance check-up  
g.4 Cargo property 
g.5 Cargo handling management 
g.6 Draft (loadage, overload) 
g.7 Kinds of ship certification 
g.8 Others 
Workplace 
Factor 
h.1 Lighting 
h.2 Noise 
h.3 Temperature, humidity 
h.4 Vibration 
h.5 Cleanliness 
h.6 Atmosphere (stench, fumes, gases) 
h.7 Ergonomic design of work place 
h.8 Work characteristics 
h.9 Influence by others in workplace 
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h.10 Absence or misarrangement of equipment 
h.11 Automation level of ship 
h.12 Diet suitability 
h.13 Others 
 
O
R
G
A
N
IS
A
T
IO
N
A
L
 I
N
F
L
U
E
N
C
E
S
 
Management/ 
Supervision 
i.1 Boarding inappropriate seafarers 
i.2 Insufficient management of eligibility of seafarers 
i.3 Education-training absence 
i.4 Education-training deficiency 
i.5 Inappropriate education-training contents 
i.6 Inappropriate education-training procedure 
i.7 Insufficient assessment or development of 
education-training 
i.8 Mismanagement of equipment & supplies  
i.9 Others 
Operation 
j.1 Operation tempo 
j.2 Inappropriate operating system 
j.3 Inappropriate ship operation plan 
j.4 Absence of safety culture  
j.5 Management environment (economic, political, 
legal, social condition, etc.) 
j.6 Budge problem 
j.7 Inappropriate reward and punishment system 
j.8 Poor working condition (vacation, shift system) 
j.9 Hiring policy 
j.10 Accident emergency countermeasures  
j.11 Others 
Violation 
k.1 Boarding unqualified seafarers 
k.2 Onboard standards violation 
k.3 Violate behaviour connivance 
k.4 Others 
 
